
































This chapter gives a avour of recent theoretical work on coalition for-
mation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election
coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) forma-
tion. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties
are compared with the help of some illustrative examples.
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11 Introduction
Political parties have long been treated in both the theoretical political sci-
ence and economics literature as unitary actors. Take for example the Down-
sian model of political competition (Downs (1957)), the multi dimensional
spatial models (e.g Enelow and Hinich (1984) among others), and even the
more recent models of redistributive politics (e.g Dixit and Londregan, Lind-
beck and Weibull (1997)) . In many of these models important results about
policy outcomes hinge on specic assumptions about party objectives.
This begs the question of what political parties actually are: what is the
notion of party that theorists should be interested in? Are they agglom-
erations of policy positions of individual candidates (Osborne and Tourky,
2002) or are they informative brand names aimed at voters (Snyder and
Ting, 2002)? Are they mechanisms to economise on the costs of standing
for elections (Riviere, 1999, Osborne and Tourky, 2002) or simply credible
commitment mechanisms (Levy, 2002, Morelli, 2002)?
One may go further and ask if we should really be looking at \parties" as
coalitions of individuals or at coalitions of \parties" or groups of individuals
{whether pre-election or post-election{ since in many electoral systems it is
such coalitions that aect actual policy outcomes.
2If we care about choice in politics we should worry about the number of
parties that a country has, their size and the platforms they take. Presumably
systems that are dominated by one party{ as in many African dictatorships{
are less desirable than a multi-party system where parties have divergent
platforms. On the other hand if party positions converge then outcomes may
not be dierent between these two systems. Indeed, if these are important
criteria for a well functioning democracy, we should also be interested in
why dierent electoral systems generate dierent party structures. Duverger
(1954) conjectured that majoritarian systems like the UK and USA would
cause less parties to emerge than Proportional Representation systems used
in some European countries (Duverger's Hypothesis). One of the most im-
portant informal \law" in political science, Duverger's (1963) Law states that
Plurality Rule systems have a tendency towards a two party system. Recent
research on political parties analyses exactly these types of questions.
This chapter attempts to overview of some of the theoretical work being
done in this area. My aim is to present the most recent work which has not
been covered elsewhere and so provide a avour of the types of factors that
economists and political scientists consider to be salient in party formation.
Hence, this chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive survey, but rather to
3focus on a few papers in detail.
The format followed is to categorise the models into those which con-
sider parties to be coalitions of individual candidates who are motivated to
form parties by electoral considerations (pre-electoral coalition formation)
and those which focus on parties in the legislature: i.e. coalitions of groups
of individual candidates who are interested in forming a government (post
electoral coalition formation). The electoral motive is suppressed in these
models. The benets of forming coalitions here are economies of scale or
the reduced uncertainty in outcomes, while the costs arise in the form of the
political compromise over policy and the sharing of the private gains from
oce.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 is concerned with Pre-
electoral Coalitions, Section 3 with Post-election coalitions. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Pre-electoral Coalitions
In order to understand the role of a party, we rst need to understand what
happens without parties: a world in which only independent candidates stand
4for election. Such a world has been modelled recently by two sets of authors:
Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). These authors'
were the rst to endogenise the candidacy decision and the factors that inu-
enced an individual citizen's decision to enter as a candidate or not, i.e. the
trade o between the costs of candidacy and the benets of getting the best
policy for a particular candidate implemented. Candidates were assumed not
to be able to credibly commit to anything but their own ideal policies. Thus
policy platforms were inexible in direct contrast to the Downsian model.
But it seems clear that forming coalitions in this set up would have divi-
dends! Candidates could share the costs of candidacy if they made a \party"
of like minded individuals, or they could improve their chances of electoral
victory if they could join a coalition of individuals with dierent policy posi-
tions thus ensuring commitment to a set of policies rather than just their own
best policies. Parties could also act as mechanisms to coordinate voters de-
cisions. The rst set of authors we survey considers exactly these variations
on the citizen candidate model.
I will now focus on models of pre-electoral coalition formation. The com-
mon ingredients of most models involves (i) a policy space Q which can
be uni or multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (ii) a private good X (iii) a
5set of citizens partitioned (according to policy preferences)into N homoge-
nous groups. It is assumed that citizens care only about policy, each citizen
has an ideal policy and preferences are Euclidean (hence single peaked in
uni-dimensional policy space). Thus, each group represents an ideal policy
position. (iv) Finally some models have a cost of candidacy.
The models dier in the main motivations for parties to form, the pre-
dictions on the size and number of parties, the models and the equilibrium
concepts employed. Among the motivations for pre-electoral coalitions to
form, the rst one we present is the cost-sharing motivation. Riviere (1999)
and Osborne and Tourky( 2002) are both models of parties as cost sharing
organisations. Although the models are considerably dierent in detail, both
assume uni-dimensional policy space. While Riviere (1999) assumes Plural-
ity Rule, Osborne and Tourky (2002) present a more general model which is
applicable to both Plurality Rule and Proportional Representation.
In Riviere (1999) the policy space is restricted to be three points on a line:
Q  R = f 1;0;1g: Thus citizens are of three types (N = 3). The model is
a modied version of the Besley-Coate (1997) Citizen candidate model. The
median voter is not known at the party formation stage, otherwise only one
party would ever form. There is a cost to entering as a candidate which is
6assumed to be not \too large" so that entry is possible in the game.
As in Besley-Coate (1997) there are 4 stages: (i) the entry stage, (ii) the
median voter is revealed (iii) voting tales place given the set of candidates
(iv)policies are implemented.
Voting may be strategic, but weakly dominated strategies are eliminated
iteratively. This equilibrium is called a rened voting equilibrium.
Two scenarios are compared: (1) Candidates are not allowed to share
costs (2) Candidates can decide to form parties which are cost sharing or-
ganisations.
In case (2) a pre-entry stage is added where each citizen may simultane-
ously decide whether to become a party president or a member of a party
(i.e. to nominate a president), or to stay independent.1 Then the same four
stages as in case (1) are played out.
Coalition proofness is demanded at the party formation stage in equilib-
rium. This ensures that parties will form { coordination failures are easy
in Nash equilibrium: if all citizens expect others not to become members
then parties are useless and no citizen will have an incentive to create one.
1The role of party presidents and members is asymmetric: only citizens of the same
type can be in a party, only presidents can decide to enter as candidates, and costs are
shared equally between all members, and citizens can be members of at most one party.
7Moreover each type can have at most one party.
The equilibrium concept is essentially subgame perfectness with the ad-
ditional renements on equilibria at the entry stage (and pre-entry stage in
Scenario (2)) {coalition proofness{ and at the voting stage {iterated elimina-
tion of weakly dominated strategies. In scenario (1) the equilibrium concept
is Coalition-Proof Political Equilibrium (CPPE). It consists of a vector s of
entry decisions (s 2 f0;1g) and a function  which describes voting behaviour
such that (i) s is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston, 1987) of the entry game given (ii)for all non empty candidate
sets C, for any state of nature I, I(C) is a voting equilibrium.
In scenario (2) the equilibrium concept is analogusly the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the whole game now called a Coalition proof Complete Political
Equilibrium (CPCPE).
The main results are that without parties, the number of candidates who
stand for election is decreasing in the cost of candidacy. When parties are
allowed:(i)Active parties are Minimal Winning Coalitions: this conclusion is
driven by the fact that members share the costs of candidacy, so each member
must be \decisive" in the sense that without him the party would not form.
(ii) Secondly the Duvergerian result that there is a tendency for only two
8parties to form in equilibrium. The paper has a full characterisation of the
CPCPE.
Intuitively this is a result of the fact that both extremist parties (all
citizens are risk averse) may prefer not to run rather than not have a centrist
candidate. Centrists therefore have a higher power in the collusion with an
extremist party. Thus there are equilibria where only a centrist party and
an extremist run. Compared to case (1) (no cost sharing) more candidates
stand for election in case (2), as expected.
Thus parties in Riviere (1999) are viewed as coalitions of like minded
individuals who share the xed costs of campaigning. However self enforcing
collusion between heterogenous parties can arise in equilibrium, in the sense
that entry decisions of dierent parties are coalition proof.
Another set of authors that considers parties to be mainly cost sharing
organisations is Osborne and Tourky (2002). Unlike Riviere (1999) however,
they are more interested in modelling situations where a group of legislators
makes policy decisions rather than a single party and candidates are not
restricted to choosing their own ideal policy. Moreover the rule chosen for
translating policy announcements by legislators into policy is that the median
of the announcements is chosen. Thus parties in their model are a group
9of legislators who vote for and support the same position. The reason for
forming parties is costly participation and economies of scale to forming large
parties.
The model consists of a set of players (nite) who decide whether or
not to participate in decision making and of so which policy to champion.
The policy space is unidimensional (it can be multidimensional as long as
candidates can be ordered on a line according to their favourite positions) and
the outcome is the median of the policies championed. The rst assumption
about payos is called Costly Participation and is dened as follows:
Costly Participation (C): If a participating player's switching to non partic-
ipation does not change the policy, then her payo increases.
The second assumption is called Economies of Party Size(E)and is dened
as:
Economies of Party Size(E): If a participant's switching to a larger party
does not change the median championed policy, then her payo increases.
We discuss an example on committee voting from the paper in the Ap-
pendix. Example 1 shows how the model works. The main result is that
Example 1 can be generalised and two party equilibria are characterised in
the paper. Regarding equilibrium platforms, they show that the smaller is
10the cost of participating, the closer will be the two parties positions to each
other.
The authors weaken the economies of scale axiom to allow dierent types
of games: e.g two stage games where players can be candidates and voters
and in a variety of games satisfying these conditions they nd the tendency
towards a two party system, thus verifying Duverger's Law. Indeed, other
outcome functions are explored in the paper that describe two stage games
which satisfy similar axioms.
Notice that while Riviere (1999) has the entry decision subsequent to the
party formation stage, Osborne and Tourky (2002) have a simultaneous en-
try and party formation decision. Moreover Riviere has exogenously given
platforms, while this is endogenous in Osborne and Tourky. Even then some
version of Duvergers Law seems to emerge in the two papers { in Riviere
(1999) the motivating factor is that the policy compromise achieved by hav-
ing two parties (one extreme and one centrist) rather than two extremes is
favoured by the two extremists, while in Osborne and Tourky (2002) the mo-
tivating factor is cost savings and the fact that the outcome does not change
if the median does not. If participation was costless it is a weakly dominat-
ing strategy to announce the true favourite position, however the two party
11equilibrium is still a Nash equilibrium.2
Similar in spirit to the Osborne and Tourky (2002) model is one proposed
by Gomberg, Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (2001). However, the motivation
is dierent { indeed, Gomberg et al assume that there are two parties to be-
gin with. Their main contribution is a denition of political equilibrium and
showing that it exists. They consider multi-dimensional policy spaces and
introduce the notion of a party as a coalition of voter-members who sup-
port a given policy which depends on their primary electorate's composition.
The overall social outcome is a weighted average of the parties positions,
the weights being proportional to the share of votes received by each party.
Equilibrium is dened as a situation where no coalition of voter members can
2A related paper by Gerber and Ortuno Ortin (1998) shows another two party emer-
gence result. Here, the policy space is uni-dimensional and voting takes place on this
space. Voting basically means that each player proposes a policy. The policy adopted is a
compromise between the proposals made. There is a continuum of voters and each type
has single peaked preferences. The outcome function is assumed to be continuous and su-
peradditive. The main result is that a unique strong Nash equilibrium exists in the voting
game which involves only two parties. The proposals are polarised, though the adopted
policy is a compromise between these. The results do not generalise to the case of nite
types since the continuity of the outcome function is necessary. Voting (participation) is
costless.
12deviate by changing their voting and obtain a preferred outcome. Existence
of equilibrium is the main result.
In the appendix (Example 2) I show that in a simple uni-dimensional
setting the platforms chosen by the two parties in the Gomberg et al solution
are the same as the platforms chosen by the endoegenous parties in the
Osborne and Tourky solution. Of course the main point in Gomberg et al is
to generalise the solution to multi-dimensional spaces and prove existence.
Levy (2002A) models party formation dierently: the main rationale for
parties to form, in her view, is the ability of parties to solve the commitment
problem of independent candidates. Parties are able to commit to a larger set
of policies: in particular they are able to commit to any policy in the Pareto
set of party members. The trade o that an individual citizen faces in joining
a party is between the gain in terms of the probability of winning against
the costs of compromising on policy. She denes the notion of eectivness
of parties { parties are eective if the outcome is dierent when parties are
allowed to form and when they are not. Her main result is that parties are
not eective in a uni-dimensional policy space.
Levy's (2002A) model has N players: there is a representative agent in
each group. There is a continuum of voters, and voters are assumed to vote
13sincerely. The model has two phases of analysis: (i) The Platform game:
Assume a partition,  of voters into coalitions, a typical coalition being
denoted S. Each coalition chooses a policy in it's Pareto set in order to
maximise it's chances for election. Not choosing a policy is akin to choosing
not to run. The winning policy is chosen by plurality rule. For each policy
chosen in an equilibrium of the platform game, expected utility is given using
a continuous and concave utility function for each member of each party. An
equilibrium of the platform game is a set of platforms fSgS  () such
that S is a policy in the Pareto set of its members given  S. Proposition 1
shows that an equilibrium of this game exists. Now for each possible coalition
structure choose an equilibrium of the corresponding platform game. Denote
this pair as (;()). This yields an induced utility Ui(()) for each player
from this pair. An unstable partition is one that is not supported by any
equilibrium of the platform game.
The stability concept is taken from Ray and Vohra (1997). Starting from a
given partition, the only deviations allowed are to break parties into smaller
ones. Deviations can be unilateral or multilateral but the deviators must
be sub-coalitions of the existing coalitions. Also deviations take into account
future deviations, both by members of their own coalitions and also members
14of other coaltions. Credible threats are deviations to ner partitions which
are stable themselves. Thus the denition is recursive. The technical details
of the denition are presented in the Appendix.
Let k denote the dimensionality of a Euclidean space V that is spanned
by the N ideal policies in society.
Her main result(Propositions 2 and 3, Levy (2002A)) is that parties are
not eective when k = 1. The only stable outcome is the median voters ideal
policy. When k > 1; parties are eective even if a Condorcet winner exists
in the absence of parties. A sucient condition for parties to be eective
when the Condorcet Winner is a unique equilibrium in 0, and preferences
are Euclidean is that k = N   1:
Unlike Riviere (1999) Levy assumes that there is a representative candi-
date in each group, given exogenously and that there is no cost sharing. But
the dependence of the entry decision on the costs of campaigning and on risk
aversion is similar in the two models.
In a companion paper, Levy (2002B), she veries the robustness of the
\party eectiveness" result under various stability concepts.
Morelli (2002) diers from the two authors above by looking at multi-
district elections and Proportional Representation. He is concerned too with
15whether \heterogenous" parties form in equilibrium, and whether parties
are \eective", although these terms are interpreted dierently from Levy
(2002A). Parties are eective if they can be part of the government, without
considering their eect on the actual policy implemented. The main question
he is concerned with is the conditions under which the number of eective
parties is larger under proportional representation than under Plurality vot-
ing (Duverger's (1954) hypothesis). Parties are active if they run for election
in at least one district.
As in Levy (2002A) citizens are partitioned into N groups, each group
composed of identical individuals (i.e. identical preferences). Preferences are
single peaked and dened on a uni-dimensional policy space. There are three
types of citizens (as in Riviere (1999)): so Q  Rx= f 1;tC;1g; where
tC denotes the ideal policy of the centrist voters, tC  0: There are also
three districts, with a measure 1=3 of total citizens and each with it's own
distribution of voter preferences. Party leaders are given exogenously, and
so are the set of potential candidates from each homogenous party. So with
3 districts, each district will have 3 potential candidates, with a total of 9
potential candidates given exogenously. The role of party leaders is to make
coalitions of homogenous parties, called the heterogenous parties. The rst
16stage consists of a party formation stage. In the second stage each party
decides whether to enter the election in each district. Then voting takes
place. Voting can be sincere or \strategic" (since there is a continuum of
voters this needs to be dened). Two electoral systems are considered {
Plurality Rule (PV) and Proportional Representation (PR). They dier in
the way that vote shares in each district translate into seats in legislature.
There are three seats (one for each district). Under PV, a seat is allotted to
a candidate if he wins (i.e. gets the maximum vote share) in a district. The
party that gets a majority of seats will decide policy. If there is a tie then the
centrist party gets to make the policy. Under PR, seats are allotted according
to the Hare rule. Here we look rst at the maximum vote share (summed
across districts) for each party. This party (call it L) gets the rst seat. Now
we subtract 1=3 from the total vote share for party L and compare with
the original vote shares for the other two parties. The party than has the
maximum vote share among these gets the second seat (call it C). Again,
subtract 1=3 from the total vote share for party C and compare with the
remainder for part L, the remainder for party C and the total votes for party
R. The party that gets the maximum vote share among these gets the third
seat. The party that has a majority of seats makes the policy decision it has
17chosen. If there is a tie again C gets to make policy.3
Exogenously given candidates get a utility from winning the election as
well. There is a cost to entry, denoted c. Thus we may see candidates
standing for election in a district even when they will not inuence the policy
given the voting equilibrium.
The strategic voting equilibrium needs to be described as it is unusual.
Strategic voting is thought of as voting recommendations made by each het-
erogenous party to it's own group of voters across districts. Thus a voting
recommendation by a heterogenous party composed of L and C would be a
3-tuple giving recommendations to it's voters (L and C voters) in district
1,2 and 3. An equilibrium with strategic voting is a Nash equilibrium in
recommendations, i.e. given the voting recommendations of all other parties
and assuming that all other voters follow the recommendations, a voter in
party i should be weakly better o following the recommendation. Let  (as
before) denote the partition into parties in equilibrium.
A voting equilibrium is strong if no coalition of parties C 2 2 can improve
on the recommendations for voters in their coalition given the recommenda-
3This is an important dierence from the way that PR is usually modelled { here policy
is determined by the majority party in both Plurality and Proportional Representation
and it is only the way in which winners are chosen that diers between the two.
18tions of all other parties.
An equilibrium of the whole game calls for subgame perfection.
In this model politicans may want to run for election even if they do not
matter in the determination of policy. The main question analysed is whether
parties are \eective" i.e. does the party have at least one candidate who
wins in the whole country?
Each group has an incentive to get it's own policy implemented. Suppose
we focus on sincere voting and PV { if two districts had the same median
voter then that group can always win two seats in PV, so no heterogenous
parties form and at most two parties are eective, generically. The interesting
case is when the median is dierent in all three districts. In this case, if all
three parties stand and win one seat then the Centrist policy is the default
option. Thus in the bargaining stage of the game both extreme parties oer
the centrist voter his most preferred policy. This means that policy does not
change in equilibrium whether heterogenous parties form or not. Indeed the
equilibrium policy is always the centrist parties most preferred position and
this is shown to be true as well for strategic voting (Proposition 1). Thus
parties are not \eective" in the sense that policy cannot change due to party
formation. Levy (2002A) showed this (see above) for a single district with
19uni-dimensional policy space.
The main result is a full description of the congurations of voter pref-
erences in the three districts under which PV has three active and eective
parties (Corollary 2) and the congurations under which PR has at most two
active and eective parties (Corollary 3). This allows us to come up with the
conditions needed for Duverger's hypothesis to hold.
I compare the three models discussed above and their main results with
the help of a simple example (taken from Levy (2002A) which is presented
in the Appendix.
All the models discussed so far assume complete information on all sides
at the voting stage. Synder and Ting (2002), in contrast, present a com-
pletely dierent view of parties. They view parties as \brand names" that
inform voters credibly about the policy positions their members will take.
In contrast to Levy (2002A) and Morelli (2002) who assume that candidates
cannot credibly commit to any policy except their own most preferred point
and therefore need parties to be able to oer other platforms, Snyder and
Ting (2002) assume that candidates cannot commit to any platform at all
and need parties to credibly signal their true policy preference. Parties act
as screening devices a la Spence (1974). The main question is to explain
20how the precise meanings associated with dierent parties (e.g. Republicans
are scally conservative, Democrats are liberal etc) arise as equilibrium phe-
nomena. The model is based on two assumptions: (i) party membership
carries costs: this is similar to models discussed above, i.e. that joining a
party means compromise. These costs are higher the futher away is the ideal
policy of a candidate relative to the party position. (ii) Voters know little
about preferences of candidates but much more about parties. This second
assumption is in stark contrast to the Citizen Candidate models (Osborne
and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)) and all the models considered
before. Thus parties must be given exogenously in the model as is indeed
the case.
There are three types of players in the model: parties, candidates and
voters. There is a continuum of voters divided into a continuum of con-
stituencies. Each constituency elects it's own (single) representative by plu-
rality rule from among the candidates who stand. The winning candidates
take oce and implement policy. The policy space is uni-dimensional again
X = [ 1;1]. Two situations are considered: one party only and two parties
called L and R. Each party must choose it's platform in order to maximise
the share of oces won by it's candidates. Candidates are driven by the
21rewards of oce and if elected, policy. Candidates ideal points are random
draws from a uniform distribution on [0;1]. However candidates cannot cred-
ibly communicate to voters except through their aliation choice which is
common knowledge. These choices are denoted by a { candidates may run
unaliated (a = 0, independents) or join a party (a = L;R). The game con-
sists of parties choosing platforms xL and xR: Then nature randomly draws
an innite sequence of candidates i.i.d from [ 1;1]. Candidates are oered
aliation with party L rst and he may aliate or not. Party R oers af-
liation to the second candidate and so on. The remaining candidates may
choose not to run or to run unaliated. Only one candidate is chosen to
aliate in each district. Then voting takes place and the winner is chosen
by plurality rule. The median across districts is the point 0.
By choosing it's platform a party implicitly chooses its mean and variance
as it can anticipate the set of candidates who join it. These are the crucial
determinants of electoral success. Voters like less uncertainty and platforms
close to their own ideal points.
When only one party is allowed candidates may still choose to aliate in
order to reduce the uncertainty that voters have about their policy prefer-
ences. But (given the specics of the model), it is shown that in such a case
22the party can locate at 0 and win all districts. By locating at 0 the party
will have the same mean as an unaliated candidate but will have a lower
variance as extermist candidates will not join the party{ it is not worthwhile
for them. The party thus screens out candidates who are too far in the policy
space. Thus equilibrium calls for consistency between the platform chosen
and the ideal points of the candidates who join it.
When there are two parties, the equilibrium can be of two types: conver-
gent or divergent depending on the value of the costs and benets of winning
for a candidate. When the relative benets of holding oce are low then
the equilibrium is convergent: it involves both parties locating at the point
0 which will ensure that they each win half the districts. Unaliated can-
didates are sure to be defeated in every district. When the relative bents
of holding oce are large however, they may get divergent equilibria that
involves parties locating at a distance (the same distance) away from the
mean and on opposite sides of 0.This location ensures (i) unaliated can-
didates lose all districts again because when the median is on the left side
of the mean, the left party wins and vice versa.(ii) each party wins half the
districts. The reason that o is no longer an equilibrium when the benets of
holding oce are large is that more candidates will aliate, with the result
23that variance at 0 is very high. If one party locates at 0 (e.g. the R party)
the other party (the L party) can do better by moving left of 0 in order to re-
duce it's variance and attract more voters { without losing out to unaliated
candidates.
In this model parties are therefore viewed as entities that will choose
platforms to attract certain types of candidates in order to maximise the
chances of winning overall given the policy chosen by the other party. The
factors that inuence party membership are (i) the policy chosen by the
other party (ii) the benets for candidates to aliate with a party (payo
from winning, and costs of standing, the costs of policy compromise) (iii) the
degree to which uncertainty is decreased (and electoral success enhanced) by
having a particular set of candidates relative to unaliated candidates.
3 Post-election Coalitions
The common thread linking all the authors mentioned so far is that an impor-
tant factor in the party formation process is the anticipated voting behaviour
that follows. However some authors suppress the role of voters and assume
the legislative composition as given. The seminal work of Riker (1962) is the
24rst to study this kind of coalition behaviour. His predictions still form the
basis for recent research on this topic: he focused on a narrow interpreta-
tion of the objectives of political parties, i.e. that they were interested in
the spoils of oce. Thus, the game is a zero sum game and this led to his
insight called \the size principle". This is the notion that coalitions must be
minimal winning coalitions, so as to maximise the gains from forming them.
Traditionally the study of coalitions among political scientists has focused on
post election coalitions between parties.4 In the interest of brevity and non
4The literature has a long tradition in public choice. The themes that dominate have
been: the move from uni-dimensional to multi-dimensional policy space and the resulting
potential for chaos if decisions are made by plurality vote (e.g. McKelvey (1976)). Several
co-operative game theoretic solutions were proposed to address this indeterminancy in
the outcome of the legislative voting game. Thus eg the Core may fail to exist in multi-
dimensional spaces. Some reviews of the extensive work on spatial theories of legislatures
are Austen Smith (1983), Calvert(1986) and Shepsle(1986).The approach taken to solve
this theoretical problem was to consider detailed versions of the legislative process: i.e. to
introduce institutions as a way to introduce more structure in the problem and to make
meaningful predictions. Shepsle (1979) e.g. proposed a structure induced equilibrium by
adding a role for committees that specialised on making decisions on particular issues.
In contrast to the much later model of Jackson and Moselle (2002)(discussed in detail
above), Shepsle argues that the operation of the committee system will not allow issues
25duplication I will focus on work that is more recent and refer the interested
reader to the reviews mentioned below.
Jackson and Moselle (2002) model the benets of party formation in the
context of a legislative bargaining game. They use the legislative bargaining
game of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and extend it to the case where bargain-
ing between legislators is taking place on two dimensions { a private good
dimension and a public good dimension (whereas in the original legislative
game bargaining was only over the distribution of a xed amount of a private
good. As in Levy (2002A) and Riviere (1999) the outcome of the game is
compared when parties can form and when they cannot. The main ques-
tion, in the context of this chapter, is to examine whether the equilibrium
outcomes of the legislative game are dierent with and without parties { the
question we saw in Levy(2002A) above: are parties eective? In terms of
the extension of the simple legislative game to two dimensions the equilib-
ria show that the two dimensions interact in interesting ways, even though
legislators preferences are separable on the two dimensions. In short the mo-
tivation to form \parties" or coalitions may be to increase the power of a
legislators' ideology or to garner extra benets for their own constituencies
to be linked and it is not possible to make trades on policy issues.
26in the budgetary process (the distributive dimension).
I will describe the model and then focus on one of the examples in the
paper which illustrates the intuition to the main results.
The legislative game has n players (legislators), n  3, is an odd number.
A decision is a vector (y;x1;x2;:::;xn) consisting of an ideological decision y
and a distributive decision which is about the division of a xed pie of size
X. The set of feasible public decisions is [0;Y ] and Y 2 [0;1]. The set of
feasible distributive decisions consists of those that have xi  0; for all i and
P
(xi) = X: Preferences of legislators are assumed to be separable in xi and y.
They are single peaked in y and strictly increasing in xi for every y. We can
order legislators in increasing order by their ideal points for the public good:
i  j i yi  yj. They have a uniform discount rate 0 <   1, the utility of
reaching an agreement (y;x1;x2;:::;xn) at time t is tui(y;xi). The legislative
game consists of a sessions t = 1;2;::: (can be innite). At the beginnning
of each session a legislator is chosen with probability pi to make a proposal
and the probabilties are the same in each session. Then legislators are called
upon to vote \yes" or \no" on the proposal in a xed order. The proposer
can choose to propose on one dimension or both. The authors show that
there is no loss of generality in restricting the rules of the game to be such
27that both dimensions are proposed simultaneously (Proposition 1). A default
utility is specied in case the game never ends. All actions are observable
and the game is a perfect information game.
Equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in stationery
strategies (i.e. strategies that do not depend on history of past play). Since a
legislator needs a majority to pass a proposal there are exactly M = n 1!
[(n 1)=2]!
sets of other legislators such that he can get a majority. A simple equilibrium
is a stationery equilibrium where a legislator can randomise over a maximum
of M proposals and each such proposal can be identied with a distinct
coalition C of (n   1)=2 other legislators who vote yes on the proposal.
Since I are more interested in the pre game coalitions that form, I will not
describe these results in detail but instead focus, as before, on an illustrative
example taken from the paper. The main conclusions emerging from the
legislative game are described in Section 6: (i) Simple equilibria always exist
and in such equilibria (ii) both dimensions are considered together and a
decision will be approved in the rst session. (iii) Each legislator has a
positive probability of being excluded from some decision that has a chance of
being approved and (iv) generically there are at least two dierent ideological
decisions that have a chance of being approved.
28To understand the model better I present an example taken from Jackson
and Moselle (2002) in the Appendix (example 4). A party is modelled as
a binding agreement between the members to act as a single unit in the
legislative game. The benets to the legislators are measured relative to the
payos in the legislative game. The set of utility levels possible for legislators
in a coalition fi;jg is described by the set of decisions that the coalition can
make in the legislative game. The disagreement point is given by the expected
utility of the legislator in the legislative game without parties.
Let uNB
i (fi;jg) denote the utility that i gets from party fi;jg using the
Nash bargaining solution to split the gains from party formation. The fol-
lowing denition applies to the three player game discussed in the paper.
Denition: A party fi;jg is stable if uNB
i (fi;jg)  uNB




In our example therefore the stable parties are f1;2g and f2;3g. A num-
ber of illustrative examples in the paper show that with dierent parameter
values there can be very dierent stable parties emerging. Some interesting
comparitive statics are derived.
Thus Jackson and Moselle (2002) conclude that parties are eective in
the sense that legislative outcomes are signicantly altered when parties can
29form but that the changes depend on parameters like preference intensities.
Jackson and Moselle (2002) focus on the dierences in outcomes when
parties can form as opposed to when they cannot when there are two dimen-
sions in the legislative game. They do not have predictions of the types of
parties that form, apart from some examples. Can we say anything about
the types of coalitions that form? When legislators care about power as well
as policy outcomes, this question is addressed in the uni-dimensional case
by Bandhopadhyaya and Oak (2002). They consider a model of legislative
coalition formation under a Proportional Representation (PR) system.
While the role of voters was suppressed in the literature reviewed above,
Austen Smith and Banks (1988) and Baron (1993) are models that combine
voting in elections with coalition formation at the legislative stage. Both
focus on proportional representation. Austen Smith (1986) focuses on multi
district plurality rule elections but does not model the legislative game ex-
plicitly. In addition to deriving predictions about the equilibrium coalitions
that emerge, these authors also derive the electoral platforms chosen by the
parties endogenously. In this sense, these models are more general than the
models of post election coalitions I reviewed above.
The idea in Austen Smith and Banks (1988) is that voters will antici-
30pate the coalitions that form at the legislative stage and vote strategically
to achieve their best policy. Although there are 3 parties competing on a
uni-dimensional policy space, there is also a distributional dimension to the
legislative game in that parties can also bargain over the spoils of oce.
Parties are interested in minimising the dierence between their electoral
platforms and the policy ultimately implemented as well as the spoils of
oce.
The timing is: rst the three parties announce electoral platforms, then
an election takes place and vote shares are determined. Finally policy is
decided by bargaibning between teh dierent parties. The weights in the
bargaining game are determined by the share of votes of each party: this
happens endogenously through the legislative game where the party with the
highest vote share gets to propose a policy and distribution of the private
good rst. If the proposal is accepted by a majority it is implemented,
otherwise the party with the next highest vote share gets to make a proposal
and so on. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this is the solution to the
legislative game for given vote shares. Finally policy is implemented. A party
needs at least s votes to get into the legislature where s 2 [3; 1
3n] is odd and
n denotes the number of voters. Vote shares of the parties determine their
31weights in the implemented policy. If a party has an absolute majority in
votes then it can implement it's own announced policy and corner all the
private benets. Assume that each party gets at least s votes.
Coalition formation in the legislative stage consists of each party making
a proposal consisting of a coalition, a policy and a distribution of private
benets. The members of the coalition can accept or reject the proposal. This
proposal is passed if a majority of the coalition members decide to accept
it. Otherwise in the next time period the party with the second highest vote
share attempts to make a winning coalition and so on. If no government has
formed after the third party makes its attempt then a caretaker government
is formed which makes its decision equitably. Equilibrium in this game is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game. The legislative game thus
diers in the detailed description from that of Jackson and Moselle (2002),
in particular that proposals are made simultaneously in the latter model.
However the ineciency of the legislative bargaining process is also a feature
of the Austen Smith-Banks model. This ineciency is driven by the risk
aversion of party members and the uncertainty in the equilibrium outcome.
The legislative game is solved using a non-cooperative bargaining approach {
an idea employed subsequently by Jackson and Moselle (2002). An important
32insight from the coalition formation or legislative stage is that coalitions that
form are minimal winning coalitions (almost by denition) but not necessarily
of minimum size (that is not a choice variable as party sizes are determined
by proportional representation). Also winning coalitions are not necessarily
connected. I.e. there may be equilibria where the two extreme parties form
a coalition { it is the parties with the highest and lowest weights that form a
coalition. This is because the party who proposes would prefer to do so when
it has to compromise less. The electoral equilibrium is fully characterised.
Unlike plurality rule the legislative inuence of a party is not monotonic in
vote shares. The expected policy in equilibrium is the median voters position,
though realised policy may be dierent. Finally not all voters vote sincerely
in equilibrium.
Some conclusions are similar to and anticipate the results of Jackson and
Moselle (2002): legislators with extreme preferences may end up forming
a coalition (unconnected coalitions), the median voter is an anchor for the
dierent policy positions in equilibrium, and the ineciency of the outcomes.
Baron (1993) has a very similar model to Austen Smith and Banks (1988)
except that parties aim to maximise the aggregate welfare of their supporters
and voting is sincere. The main result is that unlike Plurality voting systems
33there may not be a convergence of policy positions.
4 Conclusions
So, what are the main insights that emerge from this survey of party forma-
tion? The rst important insight is that although most models of politics
are uni-dimensional, it is not an innocuous assumption. Indeed the question
of whether parties as an analytical construct are important to study may
depend crucially on this assumption. Both Levy (2002A) and Jackson and
Moselle (2002) show, in dierent settings that parties are eective when the
issue space is multi-dimensional, and not necessarily when the issue space is
uni-dimensional.
What are the motivations to forming parties? As aptly summarised by
Strom (1990) the literature has focused on three main motivations: oce
seeking, policy seeking and vote seeking. Most of the models have similar
motivating factors: economies of party size (Osborne and Tourky (2002),
cost sharing (Riviere, (1999)), greater ability to commit to and obtain good
policy positions (Levy (2002A), Morelli (2001), Jackson and Moselle (2002),
Austen Smith and Banks (1988)). The costs to forming parties are the costs
34of compromise in many of the models.
A number of the papers surveyed conrm the minimal winning coalition
idea of Riker (1962), in particular when there is a distributive dimension
to party formation (e.g. Riviere (1999), Austen-Smith and Banks (1988),
Bandopadhyaya and Oak (2002)) . However, many instances are shown where
parties are not connected (e.g. Jackson and Moselle (2002), Austen-Smith
and Banks (1988)).
Many of the papers focus on showing the conditions under which Du-
verger's (1954) Law holds. Thus e.g. Riviere (1999) shows the conditions
under which two parties emerge endogenously in single district Plurality
Rule elections while Morelli (2001) shows the congurations of voter pref-
erences under which Duverger's (1954) hypothesis (that there are typically
more parties under Proportional Representation than under Plurality Rule)
is true.
What determines the number of parties? Among the authors for whom
this is an endogenous variable: Levy(2002A) seems to suggest that it is the
original partition of groups of citizens with identical preferences (although
this is not a prediction of the model): her example 2 shows that when there
are 3 groups, there will be two parties in equilibrium. In Morelli (2001) it is
35the electoral institution and the original preference distribution that predicts
the number of parties that form, while in Austen Smith and Banks (1988)
and Jackson and Moselle (2002) it is the legislative bargaining game and
the gains from trade and ultimatley the preference intensities of legislators
that determine the number of legislative coalitions that will form. On the
other hand some papers simply show the conditions under which a two party
result emerges (e.g Morelli (2001), Osborne and Tourky (2002)). Of course,
while Osborne and Tourky (2002) have sucient conditions that guarantee
obtain duvergerian outcomes for every distribution of preferences and for
every electoral system, Morelli (2001) shows that preferences and electoral
systems determine everything.
In terms of predictions about which policy will ultimately be implemented
{ the asymmetric importance of the median is a common theme both in uni-
dimensional and multi-dimensional models. Finally equilibrium concepts in
most papers surveyed here were non cooperative, most called for subgame
perfection. An exception is Levy (2002B) which explicitly uses some coopera-
tive game theoretic equilibrium concepts as well. Jackson and Moselle (2002)
use a combination approach{ they employ the nash bargaining solution as
well as non cooperative bargaining in their model.
36I will conclude by observing that an important question is whether, given
the importance of the median in most models, parties exaggerate the role of
the majority. In practice parties coexist with other coalitions { like interest
groups or coalitions of voters{ so that outcomes are far from those predicted
in this survey. Indeed coalitions may form between parties and their \clients"
in ways that are detrimental to the majority. Apart from Morelli (2001)
most authors do not focus on the welfare aspects of party formation and
this remains an open (albeit normative) question in this newly emerging
literature.
37References
1. Aldrich, John H, 1995 \Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation
of Political Parties in America." Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
2. Austen-Smith, D., 1983,"The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition:
Instability, Institutions and Information", Environment and Planning
C 1, pp. 439{59.
3. Austen-Smith,D., 1986,"Legislative Coalitions and Electoral Equilib-
rium", Public Choice, 50, pp.185{210.
4. Austen Smith, D and J.Banks, 1988, \Elections, Coalitions and Leg-
islative Outcomes", American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, pp.
405{422
5. Axelrod, R., 1970, \The Conict of Interest", Chicago, Marham.
6. Bandhopadhyaya, S and M.P. Oak, \Party Formation and Coalitional
Bargaining in a model of proportional representation", mimeo.
7. Baron, D., 1989,"A Non Cooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions",
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, pp.1048{1084.
388. Baron, David P., 1993, \Government Formation and Endogenous Par-
ties", American Political Science Review, Vol 87, Issue 1, March 1993,
pp.34{47.
9. Besley, T. and S.Coate, 1997, \An Economic Model of Representative
Democracy", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.112, No.1, pp. 85{
106.
10. Calvert, R., 1986,"Models of Imperfect Information in Politics", Lon-
don, Harwood Academic.
11. Downs, A., 1957"An Economic Theory of Democracy", New York:
Harper and Row.
12. Duverger,M., 1954 Political Parties, Wiley and Sons, New York.
13. Duverger,M., 1963, Political Parties: their organisation and activity in
the modern state, North, B and North R., tr.New York: Wiley, Science
Ed.
14. Enelow, J.M. and M.J.Hinich,1984,"The Spatial Theory of Voting: An
Introduction", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3915. Gerber,Anke and I.Ortuno-Ortin, 1998, \Political Compromise and En-
dogenous Formation of Coalitions", Social Choice and Welfare, 15, pp.
445-454.
16. Gomberg, A.M , Marhuenda, F and I.Ortuno Ortin, 2001, \Equilibrium
in a Model of Endogenous Political Party Formation", forthcoming in
Economic Theory.
17. Jackson, M.O. and Boaz Moselle, \Coalition and Party Formation in a
Legislative Voting Game", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.103 No.1,
2002, pp. 49{87.
18. Krehbiel,K., 1993, \Wheres the Party?", British Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 23 pp. 235{266.
19. Levy, G. , 2002A, \A Model of Political Parties", forthcoming in Jour-
nal of Economic Theory.
20. Levy, G., 2002B, \Endogenous Parties: Cooperative and Non cooper-
ative analysis", mimeo, London School of Economics.
21. McKelvey,R., 1976, \Intransitivities in Multi-dimensional Voting Mod-
els and Some Implications for Agenda Control", Journal of Economic
40Theory, 12, pp.471{82.
22. Morelli, M., 2001, \Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under dif-
ferent electoral systems", forthcoming Review of Economic Studies.
23. Osborne, M.J. and A.Slivinski, 1996, \A Model of Political Competition
with Citizen-Candidates", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, pp.65{
96.
24. Osborne, M.J. and R. Tourky, 2002, \Party Formation in Collective
Decision making"mimeo, University of Toronto.
25. Ray, D and R. Vohra, 1997, \Equilibrium Binding Agreements", Jornal
of Economic Theory, 73, pp.30{78.
26. Riker, 1962, \The theory of political coalitions", Yale University Press:
New Haven.
27. Riviere, A." Citizen Candidacy, Party Formation and Duverger's Law",
1999, mimeo, Royal Holloway, University of London.
28. Roemer, J., \Political Competition: Theory and Applications (Harvard
University Press, 2001).
4129. Schoeld, N.J., 1993,"Party Competition in a Spatial Model of Coali-
tion Formation", in \Political Economy: Institutions, Competition
and Representation" eds W.A. Barnett, M.J.Hinich and N.J. Schoeld,
1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,pp. 135{174.
30. Shepsle, K., 1986, \The positive theory of legislative coalitions: An
enrichment of social choice and spatial models", Public Choice, 50,pp.
135{78.
31. Shepsle, K.,1979, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-
dimensional Voting Models", American Journal of Political Science, 23,
pp.27{60.
32. Snyder,J. and M.Ting, 2002, \An Informational Rationale for Political
Parties", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.46 No.1, pp.90{
110.
33. Strom, K., 1990, \A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Par-
ties", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.34, N0.2, pp.565{98
42Appendix
Example 1 (Osborne and Tourky (2002)):
Each member of a committee of n individuals has to choose whether to
champion a policy (assumed to be in an interval X) and if so which one. The
payo function depends on the actual policy chosen which is the median of
the announced positions. If a person participates she incurs a cost ci(k(x))
where k is the number of people announcing the same policy x 2 X. The
cost is positive and decreasing in k. Each player has the strategy set X
S

where  stands for no participation. This payo function (see Example 2.1
in Osborne and Tourky (2002)), satises the two axioms C and E above. So
what equilibria might we expect? What drives the two party equilibrium
result? The equilibria are shown with the help of some gures (see Figure
4 in the paper). Suppose there is an odd number of participants: then the
equilibria must be either (i) Only one independent candidate announces a
policy which is the median of the true favourite positions of participants (ii)
there are exactly two parties of equal size and one independent in the middle
(median of the true favourite policies) position. If there is an odd number of
candidates then either (i) there are exactly two independent candidates on
either side of the true median (ii) two equally sized parties with k  2 on
43either side of the true median (iii) A single party on one side of the median
with k  3 members and one independent and a party on the other side with
k   1 members. (iv) Two independents, one on either side of the median,
anked by two parties.
The intuition for the result is the following: the trade o between joining
a party and choosing to be an independent is the savings in costs vs the costs
of compromise. However if a legislator's favourite position is to the left of
the median, then joining a party who is also left of the median in a way that
does not change the median position is a strategy that makes the individual
no worse o in terms of policy outcome but makes him strictly better o in
terms of cost savings. Thus left leaning legislators are better o joining a
left leaning party and similarly right leaning legislators are better o joining
a right leaning party.
Thus, for example let us consider why it is an equilibrium for an even
number of participants to agglomerate at exactly two positions. Suppose
the number of players is 6 and the policy space is X = [0;1]: Preferences
are single peaked and given by ui(x) =  (x   xi)2; where xi represents the
ideal point of player i. They can be ordered on the policy space from 0 to 1
depending on their ideal point. Since the number of participants is even the
44median is halfway between the two middle positions. For simplicity assume
that we have two people at 0 one at 1/4, two at 3/4 and one person at 1.
Then the mean of the two medians is 1/2. Assume that the function c(k)
(cost as a function of the number of members of the party) is given by C=k:
The outcome function takes the announced positions and maps them to the
unique median if the number of announcements is odd and takes the mean
of the two median positions if the number of announcements is even.
Then if C  9
16 there is a two party equilibrium with the left party position
x given by 1=4 and the right party position y given by 3=4: To see this: notice
that members of the left party whose favourite point is to the left of 1=4 do
better by participating than by not (gain =  [(1=2) 0]2 +[(3=4) 0]2 = 5
16
while the cost per capita is C=3 = 3
16. The members of the left party at
1=4 just break even and are indierent between participating and not. By
symmetry this is true for the right party as well. Hence this is an equilibrium
and so is any other pair (x0;y0) that gives the same medians and satises
x0 < 1=4 and y0 > 3=4. This is because if x0 > 1=4;y0 < 3=4( to maintain the
same medians) we have that the gain for members located at 1=4 is strictly
less than 3
16, so that all such members will choose not to participate.
No player can protably deviate from such a two party location (x;y).
45If any member leaves he will change the outcome to the other parties posi-
tion and we checked that he prefers to participate given the other player's
positions. Members do not want to move further to the left given this con-
guration as they do not change the outcome but they have higher costs.
There can also be two party equilibria in this example with each party
composed of two members each, if costs are given by C = 75
576:. Eg let x = 1=3
and y = 3=4, so that the mean is 13
24. At this level of cost, the candidates with
favourite position at 3=4 will be indierent between announcing 3=4 and not
participating. So lets assume that one of them participates and the other
does not. Candidates at the position 1=4 do not participate as the costs are
too high relative to their gain. Candidates at 0 will participate in the left
party and the candidate at 1 will participate in the right party.
Example 2 (Osborne and Tourky (2002), Gomberg et al (2001)):
Let us analyse a simpler version of the Gomberg et al model with a uni-
dimensional policy space and a nite set of agents. We may take the same
example (Example 1 above). In this model however the number of parties is
xed at two. Let us assume that the actual policy implemented will be the
weighted mean of the two party positions, with weights given by the share of
votes. I want to show that x = 1=4;y = 3=4 with members of the left party
46being given by all the citizens who have ideal points to the left of 1=4 and
members of the right party given by all citizens who have ideal points on
the right of 3=4 is an equilibrium. Once these platforms are announced no
coalition of agents can do better by switching to voting for the other party,
as this will shift the implemented policy away from their preferred point. So
this is an equilibrium in the sense of Gomberg et al. Of course the main
point is to generalise to the multi dimensional case and prove existence. The
idea in Osborne and Tourky (2002), on the other hand, is to show how a two
party equilibrium arises in a uni-dimensional space (or a multi dimensional
one that can be ordered by best points).
Levy (2002A), Denition of stable partition:
Denote the nest partition structure, the single member coalition partition,
by 0 and since no deviations are possible for this, (0;(0)) is dened as
stable for all (0)).
Let R() denote the set of coalition structures that are renements of . A
coalition ~  is induced from  if ~  is formed by breaking a coalition  into two.
Suppose that for some , all stable coalitions with their respective equilibria
are dened for all 0 2 R():
Denition: (1;(1)) is sequentially blocked by (0;(0)) if 9 a sequence
47f(1;(1));(2;(2));:::;(m;(m))g, such that:
1. (1;(1)) = (;()); (m;(m)) = (0;(0)), and for every j =
2;:::;m there is a deviator Sj that induces j from j 1.
2. (0;(0)) is stable.
3. (j;(j)) is not stable for any (j) and 1 < j < m:
4. Ui((0)) > Ui((j 1)) for all j = 2;:::;m and i 2 S:
Then (;()) is stable if there is no (0;(0)) for 0 2 R() that se-
quentially blocks (;()).
Example 3 : Comparison of Riviere (1999), Levy (2002A), Morelli
(2001):
There are 3 districts each of which has N = 3. We can assume that each
group is composed of ni citizens. The citizens in each group i have the
preferences: ui(x) =  (ix   x)2 where ix denotes the ideal point of voter
i 2 fa;b;cg. Let ax = 0;bx = 1;cx = 2: The policy space is restricted to
be the interval [0;2]: No group has an absolute majority in district 1 (so
the median is b), while a and b have absolute majorities in districts 2 and 3
respectively. We consider Plurality Rule and sincere voting.There is a cost
to candidacy c. Riviere and Levy (2002A) focus on single district solutions.
48Thus in district 1, Levy predicts that no (heterogenous) parties form: if all
three types run, the equilibrium will have b winning the election. If a;b form
a party against c they can oer anything in (0;1] and win, while if b;c form a
party against a, then they can oer anything in [1;2) and win. What about
ac against b? This coalition can win only if they oer the median position 1
otherwise b can enter and win on this platform. To see which coalitions are
stable: the trivial one is stable by denition and the only other coalitions that
are stable will have policy platform oered being equal to 1 otherwise b can
deviate by itself and do better. The grand coalition is stable if the platform
is 1 again: hence there are multiple stable partitions but the policy outcome
is the same. This is Levy's main result: for policy outcomes to be dierent
from the benchmark case of no parties, we need more than one dimension in
the policy space . Riviere (1999) focuses on how many members there would
be within the homogenous groups. Morelli (2001) and Levy (2002A) treat
this as exogenously given and the cost sharing motivation for forming parties
is not considered. Riviere (1999) requires some uncertainty over the median
voter{ without this only the median candidate would ever enter. So let us
focus on district 1 and assume that there are n citizens in each group (i.e.
whose preferences are common knowledge to begin with). In stage 1 citizens
49in the three groups announce their membership: they can choose to announce
themselves as president or members of a party or stay independent (parties
are restricted to be homogeneous)5. Let N0 denote the total number of
citizens in the district. The ideology of the other N0 3n citizens is uncertain
and determines the state of the world. The probability that the median
voter is a;b or c type is 3=10;4=10;3=10 respectively. Once citizens make
their announcements parties are formed and in the second stage candidates
announce whether they run or not. Candidates can be independents or party
presidents only. The median type is then realised and voting takes place.
Finally policies are implemented by the winner. The expected gain from
standing for election for a candidate depends on the other candidates who
stand for election (as this determines the probability of winning) as well as the
cost and the number of members willing to share the cost. Would candidates
from a;b;c stand independently? The answer depends on costs of candidacy
{ candidates are trading o the cost against the policy gain of winning. If
costs are small enough we can have all three candidates standing. Now let us
consider the costs to be high enough so that no independent candidate will
consider standing. When parties are allowed to form, the fact that equilibria
5This is like the membership game of Levy 2002(B)
50at the party formation stage are coalition proof means that coalitions will
be minimal winning coalitions, i.e only as many members will join the party
as are needed to make the party president of party i stand for election given
the rest of the candidates6. The size of the minimal coalition for a party of
type i is determined by the gain to a member of i from a candidate of type
i running for election given the rest of the candidate set. Denote by Mi(C)
the size of the minimal winning coalition for party i given the candidate
set C, i.e. assuming that all candidates C=fig stand for election. Consider a
typical member of party a. His preferences over the set of candidates running
for election are the following: (a) a (a;b) a (a;b;c) a (b;c) a (c): A
candidate of type c has symmetric preferences to these but a candidate of
type b is slightly dierent: (b) b (a;b) b (a;b;c) b (a;c) b (a): He is
indierent between (a;b) and (b;c) and between (a) and (c).
For the following calculations I assume that the ideal policy of a is -1,
that of b is 0 and that of c is 1, in order to have the same numbers as Riviere
(1999) has. Also I assume, as in the paper, that default utility when no-one
stands=  4. These preferences imply that Ma(a)  Ma(a;b)  Ma(a;c) 
6I.e. that makes the president indierent between standing and not standing. Note
that the entry decision is taken only after the size of parties is determined, thus it can be
made contingent on the size.
51Ma(a;b;c): Indeed, we can explicitly calculate these: given cost of candidacy
= > 4, Ma is the number that equates the per capita cost of candidacy in
the party to the expected gain from standing for election given that no other
candidate is standing: in this case 
Ma(a) = 4 since the gain from standing
is 4. Thus Ma(a) = 
4. Similarly 
Ma(a;b) = 3
10; so Ma(a;b) = 10
3 ; and in
the same way Ma(a;c) = 
2, Ma(a;b;c) = 10
3 : The numbers for party C are
symmetric. For party b we have:Mb(b) = 




Consider what happens when all three parties have candidates: can this
be an equilibrium (CPCPE)? No, because all three parties can do better
by deviating collectively to a situation where the centrist party b wins. To
illustrate the caculation, consider party a. If all three run, this party gets
3
10( 4) + 4
10( 1) whereas if only b runs, a gets  1.
Can it be an equilibrium for a centrist party b to be the only one running?
This situation is less straightforward and more interesting as parties are using
their size strategically to support this equilibrium. The answer is yes: it is
clear that no coalition involving the b party can succeed as these citizens
are getting their best possible policy. However there is a prisoner's dillemma
between the a types and the c types:in the absence of party size as a strategic
52variable, it is a dominant strategy for them to enter given that the candidate
set is (b): this prisoners dillemma exists in the absence of any commitment
mechanism. But note that in this model, the size of the party is a credible
commitment device7. Given that the size of the b party is such that it can
support a candidate set (b) but nothing bigger, this means that the extremist
parties (say a) expect to reach the situation (a;c) or (a) if they enter the
race. The size of party c is such that they can support (a;c) so both extremist
parties expect to reach (a;c) if they enter, which is worse for them than b
standing alone.
It can also be an equilibrium for one extremist party to stand against
the centrist party. Consider the situation where a;b stand for election. Why
does the party c not deviate and stand as well (since the outcome (a;b;c)
is preferred by them)? Again because the centrist party can use its size
strategically to convince the c party that if it were to enter the outcome
would be (a;c) rather than (a;b;c) and the c party prefers the situation
(a;b) to the situation (a;c) by risk aversion. The main result is this: the
set of rational expectations that supports the two party equilibrium is much
bigger than the set that supports the one (centrist) party equilibrium, in the
7The entry decision takes place after the party formation stage
53sense that the latter requires more restrictions on the size of parties.
Let us consider what happens when a party is interested in maximising the
number of districts it can win. How many parties can form in such a case and
what platforms do they oer (Morelli (2001))? a has an absolute majority
in district 2 and c in district 3. If no heterogenous parties form, in the
voting subgame we will have each group winning one seat only and the policy
implemented is the median of the three, i.e. 1. If instead we have a;b together
vs c then a;b will win the rst two and c the third district, and vice versa if
we have c;b vs a. In each of these cases the policy implemented must still be
1 because otherwise in the bargaining subgame the other extreme party will
oer 1 to b and this will be accepted. Competition in bargaining leads to the
median policy (for the country) being oered in every equilibrium. There is
no (strict) incentive for heterogenous parties to form. Thus all three groups
are eective in the sense of Morelli but not eective in the sense of Levy.
What happens with PR? With the distribution of preferences above, i.e.
the median is dierent in every district, suppose we have the following addi-
tional restrictions: party a has a (sincere) share of votes which is the max-
imum across the three districts but is strictly less than 1=2 the total votes.
It also has a sincere share of votes that would allow it to get another seat
54under the Hare quota if all three parties run in every district. Thus if all
three parties run the policy would be 0. The other extreme party c will
however decide not to run in this situation if the net gains from running are
less than the policy gain of letting the b party win. Thus there will be at
most two eective parties under PR in this scenario while there were three
parties under PV. This situation is the opposite of what is predicted by Du-
verger's Hypothesis. In order to see situations where the hypothesis does
hold, consider the preferences where no party has a majority in any district
but across districts using the Hare quota gives each party one seat if they
all run. In this case all parties are eective under PR. Under PV however it
would pay for a hetrogenous party to form so that they can win two seats
and implement 0: So there would be only two eective parties in equilibrium
under PV.
Example 4(Jackson and Moselle (2002) Example 1):
There are 3 legislators. Y = X = 1,  = 1. Each legislator has an equal
chance of being recognised (called upon to make a proposal). Their peaks
are ^ y1 = 0;^ y2 = 1=2;^ y3 = 1: Thus the median is 1=2. The preferences of leg-
islators are given by the quasi-linear utility functions: ui =  bijy   ^ yij + xi.
Possible majority coalitions for any one legislator comprise of one other leg-
55islator. Legislators have well dened ex ante expected utilities for a given
strategy prole and given the stationarity these are also the continuation
utilities denoted vi, if the current proposal is not accepted. A proposal
from i to j denoted yij;xij is a proposal that includes legislators i and j
i.e. promises them a utility at least as high as the continuation utilities and
excludes legislator k (k 6=;i;j) if his utility from that proposal is strictly
less than his continuation utility. Let b1 = 1;b2 = 3 and b3 = 6. Thus
the Marginal Rate of Substitution of public for private goods is given by
bi for each legislator i. To nd the equilibrium, we need to nd the prob-
abilities aij that legislator i will make a proposal to j, as well as the pro-
posal vectors yij;xij. The ex-ante utility of each legislator (say legislator 1)is
given by vi = 1=3[a12(u1(y12;x12))+a13(u1(y13;x13))]+1=3[a21(u1(y21;x21))+




In a simple stationery equilibrium, the utilities from the proposals that are
accepted must equal the continuation utilities, proposals made by a legislator
in equilibrium must give him a utility at least as high as his continuation
utility and proposals that exclude a legislator must give a utility strictly
less than his continuation utility. The solution to this is: a12 = a23 =
56a31 = 1. The corresponding decisions are: y12 = 1
2   1
6, x12 = (1;0;0);;
y23 = 1
2 + 1
6; x23 = (0;1;0); and y31 = 1;x31 = (1;0;0). Let us check
the conditions for equilibrium: in the solution we msut have u1(y12;x12) 
u1(y31;x31) = v1 > u1(y23;x23): Note that u1(y12;x12) = 5
6;u1(y31;x31) = 0;
and u1(y23;x23) =  5





6); thus conrming the
condition above. Similarly for legislators 2 and 3.8Thus equilibrium utility
values of the legislators are v1 = 0;v2 =  1
2;v3 =  2: Note that this is








4: This is because (1) legislators are risk averse and (2)the fact that
for suciently high discount factors there is always a positive probability
that a legislator will be excluded from some proposal { see Proposition 4.
Thus legislators can gain from binding agreements that guarantee a certain
utility.
A party is modelled as a binding agreement between the members to
act as a single unit in the legislative game. The benets to the legislators
are measured relative to the payos in the legislative game. The set of
utility levels possible for legislators in a coalition fi;jg is described by the
8This solution is generalised in the paper to dierent parameter values for the bi's.
57set of decisions that the coalition can make in the legislative game. The
highest utility that legislator 2 can make e.g if a coalition forms between
2 and 3, is given by equilibrium utility for 2 when 2 proposes to 3. Since
in equilibrium this is accepted by 3 in the legislative game, it must give
3 at least his disagreement payo. Thus this is the best that 2 can do
while 3 gets at least his disagreement utility. In cases when there is no
equilibrium proposal from a legislator to the other person in his coalition,
a direct computation must be done. Thus, in the same example: since in
equilibrium 3 does not make a proposal to 2 we must compute his highest
utility directly: keeping 2 at his disagreement utility, v2 =  1
2 the best that
3 can do is the decision y = 1;x = (0;1;0) and this gives the utility u3 = 0:
Thus we get a linear utility possibility frontier by varying y between 2
3 and
1. The disagreement utilities are given by the continuation utilities in the
legislative game: v2;v3 =  1
2; 2: The Nash barganining solution is applied
to this problem and this gives the utilities associated with the two players
forming a party. For further details of nding the utility possibility frontier
when both y and x change in the optimal decisions, see the paper. Finally,
calculating a utilities in this way we get that legislator 1 prefers the party
f1;2g to the party f1;3g and 2 is indierent between parties f1;2g and f2;3g
58and 3 is indierent between the parties f1;3g and f2;3g.
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